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The so-called Opposition Forces in 
Darfur rebelled against the Sudanese 
military government of General Omar 
al-Bashir early in 2003. The Opposition 
Forces consisted of the Sudan Liberation 
Army/Movement (SLA/SLM, formerly 
the Darfur Liberation Front) led by Abd 
al-Wahid Mohamed Nur, a former mem-
ber of the Communist party; and the 
Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) 
led by Khalil Ibrahim, a former member 
of the National Islamic Front, the main 
Sudanese Islamist party. Though these 
factions were not indigenous to Darfur, 
they justified their cause by accusing the 
government of neglecting the huge economic problems in Darfur while 
doing nothing about the increasing insecurity and lawlessness related 
to the continuous influx of high-tech arms into the region. Immediately 
after the first violence broke out in February 2003 the local government 
organized a habitual “tribal conference” in al-Fashir. While local leaders 
proposed negotiation with the different parties, the government was de-
termined to crush the rebellion through military force. It thereby used 
local militias, now commonly referred to as Janjawiid.
The Janjawiid are usually characterized as “Arab” nomads who have 
been provided with arms by the Sudanese government. The strategy of 
turning Arab nomads into a militia is not novel: it was applied by con-
secutive regimes in the civil war with southern Sudan. Both the demo-
cratic regime (1985-89) under the leadership of Sadiq al-Mahdi, and the 
current Islamist regime, armed Arab nomads from Kordofan and Darfur 
and turned them into so-called murahiliin. The recent deployment of 
similar counterinsurgency tactics in Darfur suggests that the conflict 
represents a “southern Sudan speeded up” rather than a new “Rwanda 
in slow motion.”2
Ironically, the recent peace negotiations between the United States 
of America, the United Kingdom, Norway, and the warring parties on 
the North-South conflict in Sudan which took place in Naivasha, Kenya, 
fuelled the insurgency in Darfur. The people of Darfur feared that an in-
ternational success might allow the Sudanese government more room 
to isolate Darfur and keep them out of national politics altogether. The 
anxiety of local sedentary groups to lose all grip on political and eco-
nomic power in their region seems justified by the impunity enjoyed by 
the murahiliin in South Darfur and their increasing political influence. 
At the same time, the Sudanese government favours a war in Darfur as 
it temporarily postpones the problem for the government of how to 
deal with the large numbers of soldiers who have now become redun-
dant in the South. It also prevents its officers from plotting against one 
of the most unpopular regimes Sudan has known. Moreover, the pres-
ence of oil in Darfur might be an ulterior motive for the government 
to divide, displace, and disband the population in order to “rule” the 
oilfields, as was the case in the South.
Apart from fighting techniques and the application of a “scorched-
earth” policy, the ethnic rhetoric used to justify the violence also bears 
similarities with the war in the south. In Darfur the conflict is construct-
ed as one of “Arab Muslim nomads” against “Black African farmers.” This 
religious-racial discourse of Islamic superiority hides the fact that the 
parties involved are all Muslims who are linked with each other by a 
history of exchange, intermarriage, and even life-style: until recently 
Fur farmers who converted their wealth 
into cattle might take up a nomadic 
life-style, “becoming” an Arab Baqqara 
nomad within a generation.3 Similarly, 
Arabs have become Fur farmers. Con-
structing the war as a conflict between 
fixed ethnic groups fits well into the 
Islamist government’s discourse, but 
hides a more complex history.
A religious war between 
“Arabs” and “Africans”?
Although the Sudanese Arab elite 
from Central Sudan are involved in the 
war in Darfur as affiliates of the Arab 
nomads, the meaning of “Arab” carries different connotations of class 
and culture. The educated Arab elite residing in the Nile Valley have 
constructed themselves as awlad Arab and awlad al-balad,children 
(sons) of Arabs and inheritors of the land. They were instrumental in 
founding political Arab nationalism and claimed the Sudanese na-
tion-state as theirs. By constructing Sudan both as Islamic and Arab 
they excluded not only Southerners, but other marginal groups like 
the Fur, the Beja, and the Nubians, respectively in the west, east, and 
north of the country. Alternatively, the notion of “Arab” that is used 
for the nomadic peoples in Darfur is used in the sense of Bedouin and 
indicates backwardness and marginality. 
When the current military regime, backed by the Islamist National Is-
lamic Front, took power in 1989 it proclaimed Darfur the “least Islamized 
region after the South.” This stigma concerned all Darfurians: nomads 
and sedentary farmers alike. This racist Islamist ideology has in the re-
cent war in Darfur been adjusted, or one could say “refined.” Since mem-
bers of the Fur and the Masalit, both predominantly sedentary farmers, 
and the Zaghawa, semi-nomads, have become involved in the rebel 
movement they have been cast collectively as Black Africans: black sug-
gesting the status of a slave and automatically of a non-Muslim. These 
so called “non-Muslims” have become opposed to Arab Muslims which, 
in Darfur, now include nomads. However, these recent events date back 
to a much longer history of ethnic strife and political conflict.
After the Darfur sultanate became part of the Anglo-Egyptian 
Condominium of the Sudan in 1916, it was divided into “dar(s),” ad-
ministrative areas under the control of appointed tribal leaders. This 
division led to clearly demarcated “homelands” related to fixed eth-
nic identities referred to in names such as “Dar Zaghawa” and “Dar al-
Arab,” particularly in North-Darfur. Although the tribal leaders never 
lost complete power, in 1994 the native administration council was 
“re-invented” in order to govern the area via local leaders “on the 
cheap”: it directly led to renewed conflicts in the far west of Darfur.4 
Due to ongoing desertification camel nomads, who had been al-
lotted “dar(s)” in the far north of Darfur, suffered most from the dete-
riorating environmental conditions. In particular since the droughts 
of the 1970 and 1980s they would more frequently and earlier in the 
season come down with their camels that trampled, ate, or otherwise 
destroyed the not yet harvested crops of the local farmers and threat-
ened to deplete the local water resources. 
Moreover, in the 1980s ethnic identities became increasingly politi-
cized. In 1981 Darfur people rallied for a Darfur governor demanding 
equality with other regions in Sudan under the 1972 Regional Auton-
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Since early 2003 Darfur has been the site 
of mounting violence which has led the UN to 
describe the conflict as currently “the world’s 
worst humanitarian crisis.” The US Congress 
even labelled the conflict a “genocide.” Diverse 
ethnic groups as well as the government 
were engaged in violence in the 1980s and 
1990s. However, violence has reached a 
new dimension in the recent war where 
racism has become the main legitimating 
discourse of the conflict. The recent history 
of the conflict suggests, however, that the 
root causes are socio-economic and political 
rather than ethnic.1
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omy Act. However, the installation of a Fur as 
governor turned out to be a bone of contention. 
Intellectuals claiming Arab descent organized 
themselves in the Arab Congregation which was 
supported by the government. As intellectuals 
from other ethnic groups were drawn into the 
conflict as well, ethnic differences were fed into 
national politics and became even more fixed. 
As a consequence, raids by Arab fursan (knights) 
and Fur malishat (militia) were quite un-prob-
lematically cast as an ethnic conflict waged be-
tween the “Arab belt” versus the “African belt.” 
The Fur felt that the Arabs aimed at destroying 
their ancestral rights to the land, while Arabs 
claimed that Fur threatened to oust them under 
the slogan “Darfur for the Fur.”5 The influx of high-
tech weapons in the same period due to the war 
between Libya and Chad, the donations of arms 
by diverse political parties after the democratic 
elections, and the arming of militia by consecu-
tive governments has fuelled this conflict. 
Youth, guns, and the quest 
for power
In the media the term Janjawiid, referring to 
the Arab nomadic militia, has been dissected 
into “evil” (jaan) “horsemen” (jawid), or even devils riding horses carry-
ing GM 3 rifles. However, prior to the recent conflict, the term was used 
more generally to refer to “rabble” or “outlaws”, in particular in cases of 
banditry and camel theft committed predominantly by young men.6 It 
is this reference to young men that is crucial to any understanding of 
the situation.
In the early 1990s, when I conducted anthropological research in Keb-
kabiya, a town that has been recently under heavy siege, conflicts over 
scarce resources concerned predominantly Fur and Zaghawa, groups 
that have now become allies in the conflict. The failure of traditional 
negotiation and peace keeping mechanisms, such as tribal reconcilia-
tion conferences—the last one between Fur and Arabs took place only 
in 1989, to no avail—proved to be not only due to the politicization of 
ethnic identities. Of importance as well was the discontent within the 
ethnic groups. The authority of tribal leaders, and elderly men in gen-
eral, was increasingly contested by young males. The general neglect 
of Darfur in national development plans left youngsters with few pos-
sibilities of becoming a “man” in socio-cultural terms. They had difficul-
ties paying for the bride-price and wedding-arrangements that mark 
maturity and social status. Even when they did marry, young nomads 
were hardly able to provide for their families as nomads. For their part, 
many young sedentary farmers had to migrate to towns for some ex-
tended period of time in order to earn the money necessary to raise a 
family. Moreover, despite the high expectations placed on education, 
educated young men barely had the means and ability to provide for 
their families. 
In farming communities in Darfur, women are the main cultivators 
while single young men are often redundant. Formerly they would 
wander from one Quranic school to the next, or engage in odd jobs 
for survival. Single nomadic young men were most important for herd-
ing camels. In times of drought only young men would tend to the 
smaller herds temporarily leaving behind women, children, and the 
elderly in small settlements near sedentary peoples. This process of 
settling by female nomads coupled with male out-migration among 
sedentary farmers has created communities that consist of predomi-
nantly female-headed households, of both sedentary and nomadic 
backgrounds. These populations engage with increasing frequency 
and scale in interethnic exchange, share-cropping, and intermarriage. 
As the temporary nomadic settlements have become more permanent 
and, moreover, host a larger number of young male nomads, the no-
madic lifestyle becomes increasingly extinct. This change creates inse-
curity and anxiety among the settled nomadic communities. Moreover, 
in order to survive the new settlers need access to land, water, labour, 
and knowledge, thus competing more directly over exactly the same 
resources that sedentary farmers use in these transition zones. These 
happen also to be the areas where most of the outbursts of violence 
have taken place.
In these deteriorating conditions of deprivation and despair among 
nomadic and sedentary young men “without a future,” weapons form 
an easy and immediate satisfaction in the quest for respect, self-iden-
tity, and a sense of control. The label genocide seems therefore to miss 
the point: apart form its legal complexity, the conflict has its base in 
socio-economic and political factors with a far more complicated his-
tory. Moreover, it is not clear whether the Janjawiid are ethnically ho-
mogeneous, or include young men from diverse ethnic backgrounds. 
And, even though youths who make up the Janjawiid have been armed 
by the government, this is not to say that the government is able to 
control and direct this monster it helped create. In Africa, where a ma-
jority of the population is under 30 years of age, conflicts which en-
gage predominantly youngsters is unfortunately more common than 
the “uniqueness” of the conflict in Darfur might suggest.
Due to the high presence of young disenfranchised men, the conflict 
has taken on an especially troubling gender dimension. Women are sys-
tematically verbally abused, raped, assaulted, mutilated, their relatives 
killed in front of their eyes, while young men of “battle age” are main 
targets of mass killings. This gender biased targeting, or “gendercide,” 
is part of many recent so-called ethnic conflicts.7 In Darfur, where eth-
nic affiliation is traced patrilineally, intermarriage 
results in women begetting children of different 
background than their own. This also means that 
women, as the keepers in many cases of multieth-
nic families, react to ethnic wars in a different way 
than men who tend to identify more with a fixed, 
unified, ethnic identity. Women and children of di-
verse ethnicities have in fact been caught similarly 
in the crossfire between rebels, government, and 
bandits. At the same time women have proven to 
be resilient and perseverant when it comes to con-
structing a future for their children. Though peace-
negotiations will be a long and difficult process and 
do not seem to be possible in the near future, not 
only the obvious tribal leaders and government of-
ficials should be party to negotiations: young men 
and women should be included as well. In Darfur 
the saying “Your mother’s family is from the heart, 
your father’s family comes from far” might be of 
help in trying to find an alternative, common de-
nominator for reconciliation-talks.
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